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COMMENTS

import wquld bring clarity to the law, while it would preserve the
right of the individual to provide as he sees fit by the use of a will.
"The arguments set forth in this article are perhaps not conclusive.
Much remains to be said pro and con, especially with reference to points
(2) and (3). Illinois would by no means be a pioneer in the field if the
legislature were to enact such legislation. Similar legislation has already
been passed in such states as Kansas,32 Delaware, 33 Connecticut,3 4 Maryland,3 5 Minnesota,36 and Pennsylvania,3 7 and it is the understanding
of the writer that several Illinois bar associations are considering the
advisability of recommending changes in the inheritance laws along
38
some of the lines above suggested.
DEFAMATION AND THE MERCANTILE AGENCY
Credit, or the trust reposed in the ability of one to render his consideration in the future, is undoubtedly the most important preliminary
factor in many business transactions.' It is essential that the merchant, or
person from whom credit is sought, obtain information as to the solvency
and reliability of applicants for credit in order that he may conduct his
business prudently. As a corollary, it is necessary that the buyer or
seeker of credit maintain his reputation of reliability in financial matters
in order that he, also, may continue successfully in business. Ultimately,
the credit evaluation of the applicant may determine whether or not a
contract will be entered into, and if so, its terms.
The right of the applicant to remain secure in his reputation, for which
he looks to the laws of libel and slander, as opposed to the right of the
creditor to obtain frank information concerning the applicant's credit
standing results in a clash of personal interests. The clash becomes
apparent when the potential creditor seeks to acquire information relating
to the solvency and integrity of the applicant. If, in the process of
obtaining this information, a defamatory communication is made concerning either the financial worth or personal reputation of the applicant,
the laws of libel and slander will be called upon to resolve the question
of liability.
One of the methods of acquiring credit evaluations is the utilization
32 Gen. Stat. of Kan. (1949)

c. 59, S 2103.

3 Laws of Del. (1951) c. 134, 5 4(J) .
4Gen. Stat. of Conn. (1949) c. 335, S 6869.
35
Ann. Code of Md. (1947) Art. 93, S 139A.
36 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1951) c. 259, S 259.07.
Title 20, c. 1, S 101-102.
Section on Probate and Trust Law, 40 I1. Bar J. 650, 651 (1952).
the twelve month period of May 1949 through April 1950 our manufacwholesalers' sales totaled $303 billion-ninety per cent of which was concredit terms." The Mercantile Agency, Dun & Bradstreet Inc. 56 (1950).

3 Pa. Stat. Ann. (1951)
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of the mercantile or credit agency, whose function is to furnish paying
subscribers with credit ratings of those persons in whom the subscribers
are interested. This comment shall undertake to discuss the conditional
privilege of such mercantile agencies in making defamatory credit reports, and their potential liability.
The general doctrine of privilege relative to actions for libel and
slander is based on the consideration that, in social intercourse, occasions
arise where it becomes necessary to comment upon the conduct or character of individuals, and that, for the good of society, the publication
of derogatory statements should not subject the publisher to an action
for damages.2 The doctrine, then, is based on public policy.2
Actually, the occasion creates the privilege of making the communication, and strictly speaking,
it is the occasion and not the com4
munication that is privileged.
In the laws of libel and slander, privileged occasions are classified
into absolutely privileged occasions and occasions conditionally privileged. 5 Though this comment is not concerned with the doctrine of
absolute privilege, but with conditional or qualified privilege, sometimes
refered to as "defeasible immunity,"6 it is perhaps best to consider both
for the purpose of clarity of definition.
The rule is that defamatory statements made upon an occasion absolutely privileged, though made falsely, knowingly and with express
malice, impose no legal liability, while such statements made upon an
occasion only conditionally privileged will impose liability if spoken
with malice. 7
The conditional privilege afforded statements made in good faith
concering the status of individuals is upheld on the theory that the
public or private interest subserved by the publication is greater than
the incidental injury to reputation suffered by the individual. 8 The
immunity conferred upon the occasion of the communication, that is,
the defense made available to the publisher, is but a prima facie defense
subject to rebuttal upon a showing of malice.9
2 Hubbard v. Cowling, 36 Okla. 603, 129 Pac. 714 (1913); Abraham v. Baldwin, 52
Fla. 450, 42 So. 591 (1906); Moore v. Manufacturers' Nat'l Bank, 123 N.Y. 420, 25 N.E.
1048 (1890).
8
Abbott v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 20 Wash. 552, 56 Pac. 376 (1899).
4 Atwater v. Morning News Co., 67 Conn. 504, 34 Ad. 865 (1896).
5
Blakeslee v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223, 29 Ad. 473 (1894).
6Smith, Conditional Privilege For Mercantile Agencies.-Macintosh v. Dun, 14
Col. L. Rev. 187, 189 (1914).
7Buisson v. Huard, 106 La. 768, 31 So. 293 (1901); Blakeslee v. Carroll, 64 Conn.
223, 29 Ad. 473 (1894); Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N.C. 270 (1891).
8 Cooley, Law of Torts 5 176 (Throckmorton's rev. ed., 1930).
9Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 121 N.E. 341 (1918); Beshiers v. Allen, 46
Okla. 331, 148 Pac. 141 (1915); Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S.W. 878
(1910); Ferdon v. Dickens, 161 Ala. 181, 49 So. 888 (1909).
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The law carefully guards the credit of merchants, traders and businessmen,
and oral or written words imputing to them insolvency, bankruptcy, or want
of credit are actionable per se, the rule applying to anyone to whom credit is
important in the prosecution of business. 10
However, as a general proposition, the person from whom credit is
sought has the right to inquire into the solvency of any applicant for
credit, and replies to such inquiries, if communicated to the interested
party in good faith and without malice, are privileged communications
and, hence, non-actionable, though they contain untrue defamatory imputations. 11 A principal may employ an agent to procure this information and communications between the two, made in the line of a business
12
duty, are privileged.
With the advent of a complex and expanding mercantile structure in
the middle and late nineteenth century, there came into being the
mercantile or commercial agency.13 In those jurisdictions where the
question of the advisibility of extending to mercantile agencies a conditional privilege has been considered, it has been generally held, that "a
mercantile agency's credit report to an interested subscriber is qualifiedly
(conditionally) privileged; unless it is made in bad faith or for an improper purpose, the fact that it contains erroneous unfavorable statements about the plaintiff will not make the agency liable,' 4 the rule
10Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 700, 139 Pac. 1007, 1009
(1914); citing 25 Cyc. 337.
11 "Everyone owes it as a duty to his fellowmen to state what he knows about a
person when inquiry is made; otherwise, whether or not men were honest could not
be ascertained, except by experience. But for such inquiries it would often occur that
parties about to enter into business relations with others would be unable to ascertain
in advance their character with respect to integrity or capability. The interest of
society demands and requires that inquiries may be made respecting such matters, and
that answers thereto may be given without subjecting the party answering such inquiries to an action for libel or slander, for the opinion furnished in response to such
inquiries; hence, where a party to whom an inquiry is addressed regarding another
communicates bona fide without malice to the person making inquiry facts regarding
the person inquired about, it is a privileged communication ....Melcher v. Beeler,
48 Colo. 233, 239, 110 Pac. 181, 184 (1910). Accord: Froslee v. Lund's State Bank of
Vining, 131 Minn. 435, 155 N.W. 619 (1915); Richardson v. Gunby, 88 Kan. 47, 127
Pac. 533 (1912); Rude v. Nass, 79 Wis. 321, 48 N.W. 555 (1891); Fahr v. Hayes, 50
N.J.L. 275, 13 Ad. 261 (S.Ct., 1888).
12 Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477, 140 S.W. 257 (1911); Nichols
v. Eaton, 110 Iowa 509, 81 N..
792 (1900); Knowles v. Peck, 42 Conn. 386 (1875);
Washburn v. Cooke, 3 Denio (N.Y.) 110 (1846).
13 A mercantile agency has been defined as "an institution whose business consists
in: (1) collecting information relative to the character, credit, and pecuniary responsibility of businessmen and business concerns likely to become applicants for
credit; and (2) confidentially communicating such information respecting any particular person to any paying subscriber in response to a specific inquiry on his part."
Smith, op. cit. supra note 6, at 187.
14 Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, 194 F. 2d 160, 161 (App. D.C., 1952).
Accord: Hooper-Holmes Bureau v. Bunn, 161 F. 2d 102 (C.A. 5th, 1947); Locke v.

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

being based on the general consideration of the public policy in cases
of conditional privilege. 15
It should be noted that, in order for the privilege to apply, the agency
need not show that the subscriber to whom publication is made on
request is actually interested in the plaintiff's credit because the agency
".. . is privileged to publish it to any person who reasonably appears
to have a duty, interest, or authority, in connection with the matter."' 16
However, in cases where there has been a general publication to subscribers who have not requested such reports, it has been held that
17
the privilege will not be applied.
In only two American cases have the courts denied the extension of
the privilege to the mercantile agency. Of these, the early case of
Johnson v. Bradstreet,i 8 appears indefensible, while the other, Pacific
Packing Co. v. Bradstreet,19 is, because of its reliance on the English
case of Macintosh v. Dun 20 less vulnerable. These three minority decisions have one important and common objection to extending the privilege
to mercantile agencies, though each case varies somewhat in its approach
to the solution. This common objection is that one who undertakes,
for profit, the task of reporting on the personal and financial reputation
of others ought to be positive that he includes no erroneous defamatory
statements in his communications. This view has been most forcefully
stated in the Macintosh case:
Is it in the interest of the community, is it for the welfare of society, that
the protection which the law throws around communications made in legitimate
Bradstreet Co., 22 Fed. 771 (C.C. Minn., 1885); Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 Fed. 214 (C.C.
Md., 1882); Colby Haberdashers v. Bradstreet Co., 267 Mass. 166, 166 N.E. 550 (1929);
Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868). Contra: Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet
Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac. 1007 (1914); Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886).
In England the privilege has been denied. Macintosh v. Dun [1908] A.C. 390.
15 Smith, op. cit. supra note 6, at 207 et seq.
16Prosser, Torts §94 (1941), at 847. Accord: Finkelstein v. Geismar, 91 N.J.L. 46,
106 Atl. 209 (S.Ct., 1918); Joseph v. Baars, 142 Wis. 390, 125 N.W. 913 (1910); Popke
v. Hoffman, 21 Ohio App. 454, 153 N.E. 248 (1926). However, in England, it has
been held that a publication mistakenly made to a person not genuinely interested
will not exonerate the publisher. Hebditch v. Mcllwaine, [1894] 2 Q.B. 54.
'7 Erber and Stickler v. R. G. Dun and Co., 12 Fed. 526 (C.C. Ark., 1882); Hanschke v. Merchants' Credit Bureau, 256 Mich. 272, 239 N.W. 318 (1931); Pollasky v.
Minchener, 81 Mich. 280, 46 N.W. 5 (1890); Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226,
22 So. 358 (1893); Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S.W. 753 (1888); King v.
Patterson, 49 N.J.L. 417, 9 At. 705 (S.Ct., 1887); Sunderlin v. Bradstreet Co., 46
N.Y. 188 (1871). But the insertion of a person's name in a book published by a mercantile agency, with a rating conveying no definite information, has been held not to
be libelous per se. Denney v. Northwest Credit Association, 55 Wash. 331, 104 Pac.
769 (1909).
18 77 Ga. 172 (1886).
19 25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac. 1007 (1914).
20 [1908] A.C. 390.
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self-defense, or from a bona fide sense of duty, should be extended to communications made from motives of21self-interest by persons who trade for profit
in the characters of other people?
The Johnson case curtly dismissed the "duty" aspect as applied to the
doctrine of conditional privilege. In considering whether or not there
existed a duty which would justify the deftndant's communication,
the court said:
... it was not a public duty in performing which this company slandered this
man-that is to say, made false statements about his drinking habits and mercantile character. Was it done in the exercise of private moral duty? Assuredly
not, again it may be said . .. it is immoral to speak evil, much more to write
evil of a fellow-man to blacken his character and to injure his business ...
Much more it is immoral to do so for that root of all evil, the love of money.
To slander from hatred or vengeance for wrong is bad enough; to do so by
contract for money is infinitely worse . . . the duty by contract is immoral. Is
it a private legal duty? It cannot be. "A
contract to do an immoral or illegal
22
thing is void" by statute of this state.

The court seems to treat the agency as an organization bent on the
wanton maligning of reputation and gives no heed to the fact that the
company might have been acting in good faith and for the general good
of society, or for the benefit of an important group, i.e., creditors.
In the Pacific Packing Co. case, the court is likewise heedless of the
possible good faith of the defendant, which is a vital point in the consideration of conditional privilege. The Court said:
The only safe and just rule either in law or morals is the one that exacts
truthfulness in business as well as elsewhere and places a penalty upon falsehood
and misrepresentationabout the standing and credit of merchants or corporations.... There cannot be two standards of right nor two brands of truth,
one for moralizing and one for business. The law ought to look with a stern
eye upon the liar, whether he be incorporated or just an everyday man. If a
mercantile agency can safely make false reports about the financial standing
and credit of the citizen and his business, it can take the next step with
equal
2
impunity and destroy his reputation, leaving him shorn and helpless.
Since the court is cognizant of the limitation of the majority view
which denies the privilege where malice or improper motives is shown,
and, since there was no finding that the defendant company had been
actuated by malice or improper motives, the fear of the court that the
agency might be moved by an evil purpose, seems unjustified.
The Macintosh case, though it has been criticized,2 4 is undoubtedly
21 Ibid.,
2

at 400.
2 Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172, 174 (1886).
23 Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 704, 139 Pac. 1007, 1010
(1914). (Emphasis added).
24 Smith, op. cit. supra note 6; Lible-Mercantile Agencies-Qualified Privilege, 24
Can. Bar. Rev. 545 (1946).
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the more soundly reasoned decision of the minority group. The court
considered the defendant agency a "volunteer" in supplying the damaging
report to its subscriber, although the subscriber had requested the agency
to so act. The fact that English defamation law is not as liberal as
American law in affording the privilege to persons who volunteer defamatory information25 undoubtedly influenced the decision. However, the
decision evidences a frank realization of the purpose served by the
mercantile agency. Also, there was no belief that ". . . the defendants
have acted otherwise than cautiously and discreetly." 26 The court concluded that:
....
information such as that which they offer for sale may be obtained in
many ways, not all of them deserving of commendation. It may be extorted
from the person whose character is in question through fear of misrepresentation or mis-construction if he remains silent. It may be gathered from gossip.
It may be betrayed by disloyal employees ....27
Considering the means employed by these agencies in acquiring the
information that goes into their reports, and the fact that the agencies
receive compensation for the reports, the court felt that no private or
public duty was being served, and that the agency, not the individual,
should suffer the consequences for the inclosure of any erroneous statements of a defamatory nature.
28
The many propositions cited by Jeremiah Smith in his scholarly article
in favor of the extension of the conditional privilege to mercantile agencies
seem well reasoned. He argues that if one can employ an agent to
procure credit information, the agent accepting wages, and communications between the two made in the line of a business duty are privileged,
then the same line of reasoning can be applied to the contract duty between the subscriber and the mercantile agency, even though no prin29
cipal-agent relationship exists.
There is, however, some merit in the contentions of the minority
view, as expressed in the Macintosh case. Historically, the doctrine of
conditional privilege was only available as a defense to those who acted
in self-defense or on occasions where a clear, or reasonably clear, duty
of some sort existed, and not to those seeking pecuniary reward. Implicit
in the minority view is the recognition of the right of the individual
to remain secure in his reputation. The minority jurisdictions are of
the opinion that the so-called "incidental" injury to this right in the
furtherance of a public or private good must be borne, not by the
defamed party, but by the company which undertakes for profit the
25 Hebditch v. Mcllwaine, [1894] 2 Q.B. 54.
26 Macintosh v. Dun, [1908] A.C. 390, 400.
27 Ibid.
29 Ibid., at 203 et seq.
28 Smith, op. cit. supra note 6.
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precarious business of reporting on the reputation of another.
It is submitted that no present day court would, or should, attempt
to discredit the function of the mercantile agency or its important
role in our mercantile structure. Perhaps future decisions will formulate
a somewhat modified rule in determining whether the defense of conditional privilege should be afforded mercantile agencies-a rule that
would exact from the trained credit reporter a special standard of care,
that would determine liability by judging the reasonableness of the
report in light of the facts as they ought to have appeared to the trained
credit reporter; a rule, that is, which would set apart the mercantile
agency from the ordinary individual.
PROTECTION OF MARITAL RELATIONS BY INJUNCTION
A field in which there has been great differences in result is that
of equitable intervention in the realm of marital relations to protect
personal rights. The cases to be considered are to be distinguished from
those cases which involve property rights.'
The group of cases to be discussed presents a situation wherein a
spouse is seeking to invoke the aid of equity to enjoin a third party or
parties from alienating the affections of his or her spouse. A much
noted decision relative to this issue is that of Snedaker v. King,2 wherein
a wife sought to enjoin a female defendant from alienating the affections
of the former's husband. The majority per curiam opinion refused to
issue the injunction, stating that such an extension of the jurisdiction
of equity to the protection of personal rights is not supported by
authority, 3 warranted by sound reason, or in the ihterest of good morals
or public policy. The court also stated that the opening of such a wide
field for injunctive process, enforceable only by contempt proceedings,
the difficulty if not impossibility of such enforcement, and the very
doubtful beneficial results to be obtained warranted the denial of such
a decree. Subsequent decisions denying equitable relief in similar factual
4
situations have done so on the basis of the above reasoning.
However, two very strong dissenting opinions appear in the Snedaker
1 See Bank v. Bank, 180 Md. 254, 23 A. 2d 700 (1942), where the court stated that

equity will not, by way of injunction, grant relief for personal wrongs.
2 111
3

Ohio St. 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924).

No reference was made to two prior decisions in which courts of equity did take

jurisdiction to enjoin a person from alienating the affections of the complainant's

spouse: Witte v. Bauderer, 255 S.W. 1016 (Tex. Civ. App., 1923); Ex parte Warfield,
40 Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S.W. 933 (1899).
4 Pearce v. Pearce, 37 Wash. 2d 918, 226 P. 2d 895 (1951); Knighton v. Knighton,
252 Ala. 520, 41 So. 2d 172 (1949); White v. Thomson, 324 Mass. 140, 85 N.E. 2d 246
(1949); Hadley v. Hadley, 323 Mich. 555, 36 N.W. 2d 144 (1949); Bank v. Bank, 180
Md. 254, 23 A. 2d 700 (1942).

